Julio Herrera Velutini
Date
23°C D Cloudy
New York
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LONDON - The indictment against Mr. Herrera alleges his involvement in a bribery scheme with Governor Pierluisi, aimed at influencing the outcome of an examination and evading certain reporting requirements. However, a careful examination of the allegations reveals significant flaws in the government's case.
The government's claims in Counts 5 through 7 are based on a timeline of events orchestrated by the FBI and largely driven by individuals other than Mr. Herrera or Governor Pierluisi. These events culminated in a completely legal campaign donation and do not establish any agreement or knowledge on the part of Governor Pierluisi. The government's attempt to create a bribery scheme by loosely connecting these events is unfounded and lacks evidence.
Crucially, the only explicit references to a "bribe" in the indictment come from Mr. Fuentes, who is an FBI informant posing as someone with influence over Governor Pierluisi. There is no evidence that Mr. Herrera or anyone acting on his behalf agreed to accept the proposed "bribe" or transferred the requested $50,000. The government's attempt to portray a payment made two months later, for a different amount, as the culmination of the alleged scheme is misleading.
To establish a bribery offence under federal law, the government must prove an explicit agreement to exchange money for an official act. Indictments relying on speculation or implicit agreements are insufficient. The accused must have adequate notice of the charges to formulate their defense and ensure their constitutional rights are protected.
Count Five of the indictment charges a conspiracy involving Mr. Herrera, Mr. Blakeman, Ms. Diaz, and unnamed others. It alleges bribery of Governor Pierluisi to influence an examination by OCIF and willful violations of the Bank Secrecy Act. To prove a conspiracy under Section 371, the government must establish the existence of the agreements specified, the defendant's wilful participation in those agreements, and an overt act committed by one of the co-conspirators. The indictment fails to meet this standard.
Similarly, to prove a bribery offence under Section 666(a)(2), the government must demonstrate a quid pro quo or the specific intent to exchange something of value for an official act. Political contributions are subject to a higher pleading standard to protect First Amendment rights and prevent prosecutors from chilling democratic participation. The indictment must allege an explicit agreement regarding the exchange of campaign contributions for official action, which is not the case here.
In conclusion, the indictment against Mr. Herrera lacks sufficient evidence and fails to establish the essential elements of the charged offenses. The government's attempt to construct a bribery scheme based on circumstantial evidence and speculation falls short of the required legal standards. The charges in Counts 5, 6, and 7 should be dismissed to safeguard the defendant's constitutional rights and ensure a fair trial.
The defence has filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing that the indictment does not meet the necessary legal standards for a conviction. The case involves wire fraud charges under Sections 1343 and 1346 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
Section 1343 pertains to wire fraud and states that anyone who uses wire communication to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain money or property through false pretenses can be fined or imprisoned. Section 1346 further expands on this by including schemes to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.
To establish the crime of wire fraud, the prosecution must prove three elements. First, they must demonstrate the existence of a scheme to defraud or obtain money through fraudulent means. Second, they must establish the defendant's knowing and willful participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud. Finally, they must show that interstate or foreign wire communications were used to further the scheme.
The defense's motion to dismiss the charges argues that the indictment fails to meet these elements and does not provide sufficient evidence to support a conviction. They contend that the allegations do not clearly demonstrate a scheme to defraud or obtain money through false pretenses. Furthermore, they assert that there is no evidence of the defendant's knowing and willful participation in such a scheme with the intent to defraud. Lastly, they argue that the indictment does not sufficiently establish the use of interstate or foreign wire communications in furtherance of the alleged scheme.
The defence maintains that these shortcomings in the indictment warrant the dismissal of the charges. They emphasise the importance of meeting the legal standards for a conviction and protecting the rights of the accused. The court will now review the motion and make a decision on whether to dismiss the charges based on the arguments presented by the defence.
The defence in the wire fraud case has filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming that the indictment does not meet the required legal standards. The prosecution must establish the existence of a scheme to defraud, the defendant's knowing and wilful participation in the scheme with the intent to defraud, and the use of interstate or foreign wire communications in furtherance of the scheme. The defence argues that the indictment fails to meet these elements and calls for the charges to be dismissed. The court will now evaluate the motion and determine the next steps in the case.
Government's Failure to Allege Essential Element
in Indictment Raises Concerns
The government has been unable to establish a crucial element of the offence in each count. The specific case under scrutiny is Count Five, which alleges that Mr. Herrera conspired to offer a bribe to Governor Pierluisi through a campaign contribution.
However, the indictment falls short of proving that any explicit agreement was made between the parties involved, as required by Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court has long recognised that campaign contributions are protected by the First Amendment and can only be considered as potential charges if they are made in connection with an explicit agreement between the parties, with the promise of the public official to perform or refrain from performing an official act. The reasoning behind this requirement is to safeguard the freedom of speech and conduct inherent in campaign contributions, even if they are intended to influence a public official's actions.
Despite mentioning Mr. Herrera's name numerous times in Count Five, the government fails to allege or even suggest an agreement between Mr. Herrera and Governor Pierluisi to exchange a bribe for an official act. The indictment provides little evidence of illegal conduct by Mr. Herrera and does not establish any actual agreement by him to bribe a public official. The paragraphs that supposedly detail Mr. Herrera's conduct do not implicate any criminal behaviour, but rather reflect legitimate frustrations or normal interactions within the political system.
Moreover, the indictment lacks specific evidence to support the government's theory. It relies on sequential inferences and speculation to link unrelated events and attempts to establish a conspiracy based on vague expectations of future benefits. The timing of the alleged campaign contribution also undermines the government's case, as it suggests that Mr. Herrera made no commitment to donate during the relevant period.
Additionally, the indictment includes paragraphs that purport to allege indirect conduct by Mr. Herrera. However, these paragraphs also fail to demonstrate any overt acts that would support the government's claim. They rely on incomplete or one-sided communications without providing the necessary context or evidence of Mr. Herrera's state of mind.
The indictment heavily relies on the actions of Mr. Fuentes, a confidential informant working under FBI direction, to establish a conspiracy. However, none of the alleged conduct by Mr. Fuentes implicates Mr. Herrera in an explicit agreement to offer or give a bribe. The government's case rests on Mr. Fuentes' demands and suggestions, rather than any actions or statements made by Mr. Herrera or Governor Pierluisi.
In conclusion, the government's failure to allege an essential element of the offence raises significant concerns about the validity of Count Five in the indictment. The lack of explicit agreements and the reliance on speculative inferences undermine the credibility of the charges. The indictment seems to portray legitimate attempts by Mr. Herrera to engage with the political system as illegal actions. As the government has not met the necessary burden of proof, Count Five should be dismissed.
Allegations of Bribery and Fraud in Political Campaigns:
Examining the Case of Count Six and Count Seven
In a recent legal case, allegations of bribery and fraud have been brought forth against Mr. Herrera in connection with Governor Pierluisi's election campaign. The charges, detailed in Count Six and Count Seven, assert that Mr. Herrera attempted to influence Governor Pierluisi through campaign contributions and wire communications. However, the defence argues that the government's indictment fails to establish essential elements of the offenses, including the presence of an explicit quid pro quo. Additionally, they claim that the allegations risk criminalizing constitutionally protected conduct and normal lobbying activities. This article examines the arguments presented by both sides and explores the potential implications of the case.
Count Six: Alleged Violation of Section 666(a)(2)
Count Six accuses Mr. Herrera of offering $25,000 in funding to Governor Pierluisi's election campaign, with the intent to influence the governor regarding the Bank's examination by OCIF. The defence contends that the government's indictment falls short on multiple fronts. Firstly, they argue that Mr. Herrera did not understand the proposal as a bribe and did not agree to its terms. Moreover, they assert that the payment in question was a legitimate campaign contribution, and there is no evidence linking it to any official conduct by Governor Pierluisi. The defense maintains that the described actions resemble typical interactions between constituents and elected representatives, involving the expression of concerns and seeking change through politically connected individuals.
Count Seven: Scheme to Defraud and Deprive Honest Services
In Count Seven, Mr. Herrera is accused of devising a scheme to defraud and deprive the citizens of Puerto Rico of Governor Pierluisi's honest services through bribery. The defence argues that the indictment fails to meet the foundational requirement of an "explicit quid pro quo." They emphasize that Governor Pierluisi's alleged involvement in the scheme is implicated without any indication that he was aware of Mr. Herrera's actions. The defense further contends that even if an agreement existed with a person of influence like Mr. Fuentes (a government informant), it does not constitute honest services fraud. They highlight that engaging with lobbyists of influence is a common practice in politics and does not automatically imply fraudulent conduct.
Failure to Establish a Quid Pro Quo
The defence asserts that the government's indictment fails to demonstrate the explicit quid pro quo required to distinguish criminal activity from legitimate campaign contributions. They argue that innuendo and a sequence of events are insufficient to meet this requirement. The prosecution must specify evidence showing that the accused conditioned their campaign contribution on official action, that the contribution preceded the action, and that both parties intended to be bound by the condition. The defense contends that the indictment lacks these essential elements, placing Mr. Herrera's state of mind and intent into question.
Criminalising Constitutionally Protected Conduct
The defence raises concerns that the government's case risks criminalizing constitutionally protected conduct and normal lobbying activities. They argue that campaign contributions are an exercise of one's expressive and associational rights under the First Amendment. Ingratiation and access to elected officials are recognized as fundamental aspects of democracy, enabling constituents to support candidates who align with their beliefs and interests. The defense asserts that attempting to criminalize such interactions would have a chilling effect on lawful interactions between elected officials and constituents, thereby impeding the democratic process.
The case against Mr. Herrera, as detailed in Count Six and Count Seven, presents allegations of bribery and fraud related to campaign contributions. However, the defence contends that the government's indictment fails to establish essential elements and relies on ambiguous third-party statements. Furthermore, they argue that the allegations risk criminalising constitutionally protected conduct and normal political interactions. The outcome of this case will have significant implications for the interpretation of bribery laws and the exercise of First Amendment rights in the context of political campaigns.
In conclusion, the case against Mr. Herrera presents a crucial intersection between political contributions, lobbying activities, and allegations of bribery and fraud. The defense argues that the government's indictment fails to meet the required standard of proof and raises concerns about potential infringement on constitutionally protected conduct.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of political contributions as a means for individuals to express their beliefs and interests and for candidates to be responsive to their constituents. The government's attempt to equate ingratiation and access with corruption is contrary to the Court's stance. Furthermore, the judiciary has consistently upheld a higher pleading standard in campaign contribution cases, reinforcing the need for explicit evidence rather than circumstantial indications.
The defense contends that the government's case lacks the necessary elements to establish a quid pro quo agreement between Mr. Herrera and Governor Pierluisi. The absence of explicit evidence of an agreement and Governor Pierluisi's alleged ignorance of the scheme undermines the bribery charges. As such, the defense argues for the dismissal of Counts Five, Six, and Seven, as they fail to charge essential elements of the offenses and risk criminalizing constitutionally protected conduct.
The outcome of this case will have significant implications for the interpretation of bribery laws, the exercise of First Amendment rights in political campaigns, and the boundaries between legitimate political activities and criminal conduct. It remains to be seen how the court will weigh these factors and reach a decision.
In light of these arguments, Mr. Herrera respectfully requests the court to dismiss Counts Five, Six, and Seven of the Indictment pending against him.